Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Tuning the Obviousness Inquiry After KSR
Mark D. Janis
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, mdjanis@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Janis, Mark D., "Tuning the Obviousness Inquiry After KSR" (2012). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 802.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/802

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS
VOLUME 7, ISSUE 4 SPRING 2012

TUNING THE OBVIOUSNESS INQUIRY AFTER KSR
Mark D. Janis *
© Mark D. Janis
Cite as: 7 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 335 (2012)
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-law/handle/1773.1/1125

ABSTRACT
One of the most important and delicate judicial tasks in
patent law is to keep the obviousness doctrine in
reasonable working order. There are several reasons why
the obviousness doctrine has been the subject of frequent
judicial tinkering. First, patentability doctrines interact
with each other, so doctrinal alterations that seem to be
entirely external to the obviousness doctrine frequently
have ripple effects on obviousness. The interaction between
the utility and obviousness doctrines provides one good
example. Second, the obviousness doctrine is internally
complex. Cases in the chemical and biotechnology areas
over the past several decades have amply illustrated this
point. This Article examines Chief Judge Rader’s
contributions to the task of tuning the obviousness doctrine,
with particular attention to cases that have arisen after the
Supreme Court’s pronouncements on obviousness in KSR
v. Teleflex.
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INTRODUCTION
The obviousness doctrine is rightly considered one of the most
crucial legal innovations in patent jurisprudence. 1 It also may be as
difficult a concept to implement as any in patent law, or in law
generally. Given its strong sensitivity to context and its holistic
orientation, it seems apparent that obviousness will never be
captured in a comprehensive legislative code. Obviousness, then,
presents judges with an unenviable and ongoing maintenance task.
This Article, which focuses on Chief Judge Rader’s
contributions to the obviousness jurisprudence, shows that judicial
attention is critical, whether the task is to reconfigure the
doctrine’s very foundations or simply to conduct routine
maintenance. Part I addresses obviousness in the context of other
patentability doctrines (in particular, the utility and disclosure
doctrines), and observes that changes to these doctrines frequently
have ripple effects for the law of obviousness, drawing on
examples both pre- and post-KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc.2 Parts II and III take up selected aspects of the obviousness
doctrine itself, examining the ongoing task of judicial fine-tuning

1

John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study in Legal Innovation, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2007).
2
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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after KSR and presenting it as one of patent law’s most important
judicial labors.
I. BALANCING OBVIOUSNESS AGAINST UTILITY AND DISCLOSURE
DOCTRINES
The obviousness doctrine is too often viewed in isolation. To
be sure, the obviousness jurisprudence is vast, and the obviousness
inquiry in any given case may require immersion in a wealth of
technical facts. However, obviousness is merely one component of
a constellation of patentability requirements that interact with one
another. In particular, tuning of the obviousness doctrine is quite
likely to have collateral consequences for the utility and
description doctrines—and vice versa. Two important
biotechnology patent cases—In re Fisher 3 and In re Kubin 4—
illustrate the point especially well.
A. Obviousness v. Section 101 Utility: The Fisher Dissent
Fisher, the expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”) case, is
principally about the requirement that the invention claimed in a
patent evince “substantial” and “specific” utility. 5 For the first
time, the Federal Circuit squarely and explicitly embraced the
Brenner v. Manson 6 utility standard, positioning the utility
requirement as a non-trivial obstacle to patentability, at least in
some areas of chemical and biotechnological research. 7 The Fisher
court also applied a gloss to the Brenner standard, attempting, with

3

421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
5
From a policy perspective, Fisher may be viewed as the culmination of a
long-running debate over whether the award of patent rights on ESTs and other
research tools would give rise to a potentially catastrophic “anticommons.”
However, Judge Michel’s opinion for the panel majority declined to engage
directly in an analysis of “public policy considerations which are more
appropriately directed to Congress.” Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378.
6
383 U.S. 519 (1966).
7
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370-71.
4
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rather limited success, to define the concepts of substantiality and
specificity. 8
That the Federal Circuit would endorse a robust utility
requirement in Fisher was by no means a foregone conclusion. The
Federal Circuit’s pre-Fisher utility jurisprudence, exemplified by
the court’s opinion in In re Brana, 9 seemed to have established a
relatively permissive approach to utility. At the time, it appeared
that an applicant’s credible assertions of utility would establish
prima facie utility in most cases, shifting to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) the responsibility for mustering rebuttal
evidence, a task that the PTO was generally not well-suited to
undertake. But the practice of patenting ESTs had drawn
significant scholarly criticism, and the PTO’s 2001 utility
guidelines had sent a strong signal that EST claims would be
closely scrutinized for compliance with the utility requirement.10
Nor did Judge Michel’s opinion in Fisher garner unanimous
support. Judge Rader dissented. 11 Much of the dissenting opinion
questions the wisdom of using the utility doctrine to filter research
tools out of the patent system. In a key passage that has received
less attention than it warrants, Judge Rader acknowledged that the
PTO’s impulse might be sound, but it had chosen the wrong
doctrine to effectuate that impulse:
The Office needs some tool to reject inventions that
may advance the “useful arts” but not sufficiently to
warrant the valuable exclusive right of a patent. The
Patent Office has seized upon this utility
requirement to reject these research tools as
contributing “insubstantially” to the advance of the
useful arts. The utility requirement is ill suited to
that task, however, because it lacks any standard for
assessing the state of the prior art and the
contributions of the claimed advance. The proper
tool for assessing sufficient contribution to the
8

Id. at 1371.
51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
10
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001).
11
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379 (Rader, J, dissenting).
9
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useful arts is the obviousness requirement . . . . 12
Why had the PTO not gravitated to the obviousness
requirement already? Judge Rader blamed the Federal Circuit. 13
The Federal Circuit’s approach to obviousness for DNA inventions
in In re Deuel, 14 observed Judge Rader, had created a dilemma for
the PTO, reducing the threshold for obviousness to such a degree
that it deprived the PTO of the opportunity to use obviousness in
its ordinary role as the principal fine-tuning mechanism among
patentability doctrines. 15 It was understandable that the PTO had
elaborated a more robust form of the utility doctrine as a
counterbalance to a toothless obviousness requirement—but, as
Judge Rader recognized, this was an inferior solution. The
problem, as Judge Rader saw it, was potential obviousness, and the
obviousness doctrine should supply the solution. That is,
rather than distort the utility test, the Patent Office
should seek ways to apply the correct test, the test
used world wide for such assessments (other than in
the United States), namely inventive step or
obviousness. 16
This insight—that the obviousness and utility doctrines
interact—is an important one, having deep historical roots. The
earliest U.S. patent statutes did not include an obviousness
requirement, nor was any such requirement firmly established in
the then-existing case law. But the statute did permit patent rights
to be defeated if the invention was not “sufficiently useful and
important.”17 Judges never embraced this criterion as the ultimate
test of patentability, and it eventually fell into disuse while the
obviousness doctrine flourished. Perhaps judges instinctively
understood that an unhinged inquiry into “importance” would be
12

Id. at 1381-82.
Id. at 1382.
14
51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that prior art disclosure of the
protein plus general knowledge of cloning did not suffice to render obvious a
claim to the gene coding for that protein).
15
Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1382 (Rader, J., dissenting).
16
Id.
17
1790 Patent Act § 1; 1836 Patent Act § 7.
13
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too subjective as a patentability tool, while an obviousness
inquiry—requiring a comparison with discrete, identified prior art
evidence—might be more disciplined. 18 Judge Rader’s Fisher
dissent is a powerful reminder of our longstanding commitment to
obviousness as the ultimate condition of patentability. 19
B. Obviousness and the § 112 Written Description
The obviousness doctrine interacts with other patentability
conditions beyond utility. A primary example is the written
description requirement. 20 In Regents of the University of
California v. Eli Lilly & Co. 21 and its progeny, the Federal Circuit
had invoked the written description requirement aggressively
against inventors who claimed chemical entities in terms of
function or result without apparent knowledge of the structure that
would bring about that function or result. 22 Some observers viewed
the relatively rigorous written description standard as a
counterbalance to the relatively generous obviousness standard as
expressed in Deuel.
In a major decision, In re Kubin, 23 Judge Rader dealt with the
obviousness standard directly, as he had been unable to do in
Fisher. Kubin involved “a classic biotechnology invention—the
isolation and sequencing of a human gene that encodes a particular
domain of a protein.” 24 The rejected claims were drawn to isolated
polynucleotides having a specified sequence and binding to a
specified protein. The specification disclosed sequences for two
18

See Mark D. Janis, Daniel Webster’s Patent Cases (manuscript in
progress).
19
Of interest, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom acknowledged the
Fisher approach to the utility requirement, but declined to incorporate that
approach into U.K. jurisprudence on the industrial applicability requirement.
Human Genome Sci. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2011] UKSC 51, [38-41]
(concluding that gene sequence claims were supported by a sufficient showing
of industrial applicability).
20
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
21
119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
22
Id. at 1567.
23
In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
24
Id. at 1352.
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polynucleotides falling within the scope of the claims. The PTO
had rejected the claims as lacking adequate written description
support, on the ground that possession of the two disclosed
sequences did not establish possession of the claimed genus. 25 The
PTO had also rejected the claimed subject matter for
obviousness. 26
Although both rejections were at issue on appeal, Judge Rader
neatly evaded the written description issue by analyzing and
upholding the obviousness rejection, dispensing with Deuel in the
process. 27 The prior art references at issue taught the protein of
interest, and techniques for isolating and sequencing the gene
coding for that protein were well-established. Moreover, the
protein was thought to have a role in immune response, so a person
of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to derive the
sequence. This made out a case of obviousness, Judge Rader
asserted. 28
Judge Rader’s conclusion directly contravened Deuel, in which
the Federal Circuit had said that “the existence of a general method
of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to
the question whether the specific molecules themselves would
have been obvious,” in the absence of prior art suggesting the
DNAs. 29 Discarding Deuel, of course, ordinarily would have
required a vote of the Federal Circuit en banc. However, Judge
Rader argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR 30 had
“unambiguously discredited” Deuel, 31 for reasons discussed in
more detail below. 32
Kubin is rightly recognized as a leading obviousness case, but,
by negative implication, it is a leading written description case. It
25

Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1354.
27
Id. at 1353.
28
Id. at 1354.
29
Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559.
30
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
31
More precisely, Judge Rader asserted that KSR had discredited Deuel to
the extent that Deuel had implied that the obviousness inquiry could not take
account of evidence that an invention was obvious to try. Kubin, 561 F.3d at
1358.
32
See infra II.B.
26
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demonstrates that by refining the obviousness inquiry, courts can
reduce the need to rely on the written description requirement.
Given the well-documented awkwardness of the written
description requirement, that is a very good thing.
II. OBVIOUSNESS DOCTRINE AFTER KSR
KSR is a watershed case on obviousness doctrine—but how,
exactly? The point is perhaps more debatable than the watershed
tag might suggest. KSR has certainly altered the PTO and
practitioner ethos around the obviousness doctrine, reinforcing the
proposition that obviousness is indeed the ultimate condition of
patentability. KSR has also led to some discrete doctrinal changes,
as Kubin illustrates. But it is not clear that KSR has wrought
sweeping changes in the letter of obviousness doctrine—nor is it
clear that KSR ought to be construed in such a way. The Federal
Circuit has done a creditable job of moderating some of the
immediate post-KSR hysteria, and in knitting together pre-KSR
obviousness principles with KSR’s rhetoric. Judge Rader’s
contributions to this effort have been important.
A. The Continued Vitality of the (Flexible) TSM Test: Translogic
In the immediate aftermath of KSR, it was difficult to predict
what would become of the teaching/suggestion/motivation (TSM)
test. The Supreme Court had acknowledged that the TSM test
“captured a helpful insight,” 33 but criticized applications of it that
were allegedly rigid. It was conceivable that courts would conclude
that virtually all efforts to use the TSM test were impermissibly
rigid.
Thus, it was important that, a few months after KSR, Judge
Rader handed down a decision that helped put to rest the rumors of
the TSM test’s de facto demise. In In re Translogic, 34 Judge Rader
characterized KSR as having “reiterated the basic principles for an
obviousness inquiry” 35—a useful moderating signal—and as
33

KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
35
Id. at 1259.
34
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having “corrected a rather straightforward error.” 36 The error was
the court’s failure to recognize that a prior art reference contributes
to the public domain what not only it discloses, but also obvious
variants of what it discloses, compounded by the further error of
failing to observe that those obvious variants might extend beyond
the specific problem that the prior art reference apparently
addresses. The error was not, therefore, the use of the TSM test,
which remained viable, at least in its more flexible incarnation:
[A]s the Supreme Court suggests, a flexible
approach to the TSM test prevents hindsight and
focuses on evidence before the time of invention
without unduly constraining the breadth of
knowledge available to one of ordinary skill in the
art during the obviousness analysis. 37
These comments, and others like them, lend an important
moderating tone to the post-KSR obviousness jurisprudence. Some
obviousness arguments surely are the product of hindsight, and
concerns about hindsight should remain part of the obviousness
calculus, even if they should not become all-purpose excuses for
undermining obviousness as a policy tool. In keeping with the
theme of maintaining balance in obviousness law, it did not hurt
that Judge Rader’s pronouncements in Translogic were made in
the course of a decision to uphold the Board’s obviousness
determination. 38
Translogic and other post-KSR decisions appear to have put the
Federal Circuit firmly back into the practice of invoking the TSM
test, albeit flexibly. Indeed, Judge Rader reiterated his defense of
the flexible motivation test a year later, in Ortho-McNeil
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.:
The TSM test, flexibly applied, merely assures that
the obviousness test proceeds on the basis of
36

Id.
Id. at 1260 (citation omitted). One might expect that Judge Rader would
cite KSR in support of this proposition about what the Supreme Court was
supposed to have suggested in KSR. Instead, perhaps tellingly, Judge Rader cited
a pre-KSR Federal Circuit case, In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
38
Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1262.
37
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evidence—teachings, suggestions (a tellingly broad
term), or motivations (an equally broad term)—that
arise before the time of invention as the statute
requires. 39
Finally, in Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd., 40
Judge Rader demonstrated that the command in KSR for flexibility
would not preclude the Federal Circuit from applying
particularized rules to assess motivation in select cases. In
chemical compound cases, Judge Rader ruled that “post-KSR, a
prima facie case of obviousness for a chemical compound still, in
general, begins with the reasoned identification of a lead
compound,” 41 where “lead compound” in this context had been
defined in prior cases as “a compound in the prior art that would be
most promising to modify in order to improve upon” the properties
relevant in the case. 42 The lead compound rule was consistent with
KSR’s “assumptions about the prior art landscape”:
First, KSR assumes a starting reference point or
points in the art, prior to the time of invention, from
which a skilled artisan might identify a problem and
pursue potential
solutions.
Second,
KSR
presupposes that the record up to the time of
invention would give some reasons, available
within the knowledge of one of skill in the art, to
make particular modifications to achieve the
claimed compound. Third, the Supreme Court’s
analysis in KSR presumes that the record before the
time of invention would supply some reasons for
39

Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2008). While Judge Rader attributed these insights to the Supreme
Court, he cited his own remarks in Translogic as support.
40
533 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
41
Id. at 1359.
42
Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Takeda was a Judge Lourie opinion, but Judge Rader had
invoked the “lead compound” concept in earlier cases. See Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming
a ruling of no obviousness); Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal,
Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same).
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narrowing the prior art universe to a “finite number
of identified, predictable solutions.” 43
The lead compound rule restates basic concepts to tailor them
for use in chemical obviousness, and finds some support in KSR, as
Judge Rader’s Eisai opinion illustrates. By the same token, it also
treads close to the forbidden territory of “rigid” motivation rules, 44
and this concern would be heightened if the rule becomes the
foundation for a formalized hierarchy of corollaries, or if the rule is
invoked reflexively and woodenly to negate obviousness proofs
irrespective of the factual context. On balance, the lead compound
rule is constructive, and has continued to play a prominent role in
post-KSR chemical obviousness cases. 45

43

Eisai, 533 F.3d at 1359 (citations omitted).
Judge Lourie has defended the lead compound analysis against arguments
that it contravenes KSR. Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 20111126, 2011-1127, 2012 WL 1571414 at *7 (Fed. Cir. May 7, 2012) (approving
of the district court’s analysis); Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619
F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“While the lead compound analysis must, in
keeping with KSR, not rigidly focus on the selection of a single, best lead
compound, the analysis still requires the challenger to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason
to select a proposed lead compound or compounds over other compounds in the
prior art.”) (citation omitted). Judge Lourie elaborated that “proving a reason to
select a compound as a lead compound depends on more than just structural
similarity, but also knowledge in the art of the functional properties and
limitations of the prior art compounds.” Id.
45
Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1007 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (Ward, J., sitting by designation); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Huff, J., sitting by
designation) (“An obviousness argument based on structural similarity between
claimed and prior art compounds ‘clearly depends on a preliminary finding that
one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected [the prior art compound] as a
lead compound.’”) (quoting Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1359) (citation omitted). But
see Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“[T]he term ‘reference composition’ is more appropriate than ‘lead
compound’ when considering obviousness for a chemical composition that the
infringer deliberately imitates,” as in a case in which the patented formulation
was intended to mimic a formulation previously approved by the FDA).
44
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B. The Proper Role of the “Obvious to Try” Inquiry
For some years prior to KSR, courts analyzing obviousness in
chemical composition cases invoked the “obvious to try” rhetoric.
In the pre-KSR cases, “obvious to try” signified an error—namely,
the error of finding obviousness where the evidence merely
established that it would have been obvious to try a combination of
alternatives. In KSR, the Court inverted the concept, invoking it as
if it were a synonym for obviousness. This left the Federal Circuit
with an important (albeit aggravating) question: was the new
obvious-to-try label an unwitting slip of the pen, or had the Court
intended to signal a significant change in the analysis of
obviousness of composition inventions (especially selection
inventions) in the chemical and biotechnology areas?
Judge Rader carved out a position soon after KSR. Dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc in Pfizer, he insisted that
“‘obvious to try’ jurisprudence has a very limited application in
cases [involving ‘unpredictable pharmaceutical inventions’].” 46 In
a similar vein, in Ortho-McNeil, Judge Rader asserted that “KSR
posits a situation with a finite, and in the context of the art, small
or easily traversed, number of options that would convince an
ordinarily skilled artisan of obviousness.” 47 He proceeded to
remark that the obviousness analysis was in error when it “retraced
the path of the inventor with hindsight, discounted the number and
complexity of the alternatives, and concluded that the invention of
[the compound at issue] was obvious.” 48 This was a reiteration of
the traditional understanding of the obvious-to-try concept,
although Judge Rader did not explicitly invoke it.
Kubin, introduced above, is undoubtedly the most important
contribution to the refinement of the post-KSR obvious-to-try
46

Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. 488 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Rader considered it wiser
to employ a “reasonable expectation of success” analysis. Id.; see also Amgen
Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Schall,
J.) (“An obviousness determination requires that a skilled artisan would have
perceived a reasonable expectation of success in making the invention in light of
the prior art.”).
47
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., 520 F.3d at 1364.
48
Id.
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jurisprudence. Invoking the Federal Circuit’s In re O’Farrell
case, 49 Judge Rader provided an important reminder of the preKSR understanding of the obvious-to-try label: the real task at issue
is to determine when an invention that might seem obvious to try is
erroneously deemed to have been obvious. As Judge Rader noted,
the Federal Circuit had identified two types of such errors long
before KSR. In the first type:
what would have been “obvious to try” would have
been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous
possible choices until one possibly arrived at a
successful result, where the prior art gave either no
indication of which parameters were critical or no
direction as to which of many possible choices is
likely to be successful. In such circumstances,
where a defendant merely throws metaphorical darts
at a board filled with combinatorial prior art
possibilities, courts should not succumb to hindsight
claims of obviousness. 50
Quite delicately, Judge Rader connected this proposition to the
language of KSR: “The inverse of this proposition is succinctly
encapsulated by the Supreme Court’s statement in KSR that where
a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known options’ from a ‘finite
number of identified, predictable solutions,’ obviousness under
§103 arises.” 51 This is perhaps better than stating that the Supreme
Court simply had its rhetoric backwards. As for the second type,
what was “obvious to try” was to explore a new
technology or general approach that seemed to be a
promising field of experimentation, where the prior
art gave only general guidance as to the particular
form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.
Again, KSR affirmed the logical inverse of this
statement by stating that § 103 bars patentability
unless “the improvement is more than the
49

853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1359 (citation omitted).
51
Id.
50
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predictable use of prior art elements according to
their established functions.” 52
Judge Rader’s Kubin opinion provides a framework for
connecting the pre- and post-KSR obvious-to-try jurisprudence. It
confirms that obvious-to-try arguments have a place in
obviousness analysis, but confines them appropriately.
III. THE APPELLATE ROLE IN OBVIOUSNESS DETERMINATIONS
KSR’s most profound long-term effect may be on process. KSR
provided an important reminder that the Federal Circuit should not
superintend obviousness casually, or through rote application of
mechanical rules. But KSR also signaled that notwithstanding the
case-specific, factually rich nature of obviousness analysis,
obviousness was still amenable to summary judgment. 53 It falls
primarily on the Federal Circuit, exercising its de novo review
authority, to sort through complex disputes to determine when
summary judgments striking down claims for obviousness should
be upheld. The Media Technologies Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck
Co. 54 case demonstrates how difficult this exercise is likely to be.
Media Technologies will probably never make anyone’s list of
classic patent law cases, but its lessons are in fact illustrative of the
52

Id. at 1359-60 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 417).
The Court asserted that:
[t]o the extent the [Federal Circuit] understood the Graham
approach to exclude the possibility of summary judgment
when an expert provides a conclusory affidavit addressing the
question of obviousness, it misunderstood the role expert
testimony plays in the analysis. In considering summary
judgment on that question the district court can and should
take into account expert testimony, which may resolve or keep
open certain questions of fact. That is not the end of the issue,
however. The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal
determination. Where, as here, the content of the prior art, the
scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the
art are not in material dispute, and the obviousness of the
claim is apparent in light of these factors, summary judgment
is appropriate.
KSR, 550 U.S. at 426-27 (citation omitted).
54
596 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
53
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difficulties that have arisen in scores of obviousness cases ranging
across many decades. Media Technologies involved a patent that
claimed a memorabilia card—a card depicting a famous
personality, accompanied by a piece of a memorabilia item
associated with that personality. 55 The district court had
invalidated the claims on summary judgment based on
obviousness.
In a 2-1 decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed. The majority
opinion cast the obviousness case in straightforward terms: trading
cards were known, sometimes including attached items (although
not memorabilia, and not on sports cards); memorabilia was
known; and the combination was prima facie obvious. The panel
majority was unmoved by the patentee’s secondary considerations
evidence. The patentee’s product had been commercially
successful, but the patentee had not established any nexus between
the commercial success and the merits of the claimed invention.
Even if a nexus were presumed, the commercial success showing
was insufficient to overcome the “strong showing of
obviousness.” 56 Moreover, the physical limitations of the trading
cards suggested that this was an endeavor in which the available
range of solutions was finite, making it easier to justify
obviousness on an obvious-to-try rationale.
Dissenting, Judge Rader painted a starkly different picture of
the evidence. In Judge Rader’s rendering, the prima facie case of
obviousness was dubious. The defendant’s argument was based on
four prior art references that a person of ordinary skill in the art
might not even consider, much less combine, according to Judge
Rader. 57 It was merely the defendant’s expert declaration that knit
the references together, and that declaration was conclusory, in
Judge Rader’s view. Moreover, per Judge Rader, the majority had
elevated the defendant’s expert affidavits while ignoring the
plaintiff’s.
55

Some claims required that the card be a sports card, and other claims
were directed to the fragment of memorabilia.
56
Id. at 1339.
57
Id. at 1342 (Rader, J., dissenting). Perhaps this hints at an argument that
the references are not even analogous art, although Judge Rader did not
explicitly advance that theory.
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Indeed, the story of the invention, as Judge Rader told it, was
rather remarkable: when the inventor first presented the idea of
cutting up memorabilia and attaching it to trading cards, the
trading card companies apparently expressed horror at the prospect
of destroying memorabilia, then quickly came around once the
inventor’s product proved to be a commercial success. As Judge
Rader read the record, the accolades for the invention were
substantial—“the newly-released cards became a staple of the
industry” 58—and the idea embodied in the patent was the “focal
point” 59 of promotional campaigns for the product, which would
presumably be relevant to the nexus requirement. In addition, to
Judge Rader, the prima facie case based on the prior art references
was not so straightforward. None of the prior art references were
“remotely related to the sport trading card industry,” according to
Judge Rader. 60 The references depicted entertainers or (in one
case) religious figures, and the items attached to the cards were not
represented to be authentic memorabilia items.
Judge Rader’s dissent demonstrates two points of significance
beyond the immediate concerns of the case. First, it provides a
good reminder that obviousness analysis frequently does call for
nuanced assessments of the facts. Notwithstanding the KSR
Court’s invitation to lower courts to grant summary judgment on
obviousness, summary judgment is likely to be an appropriate
vehicle in only a modest number of cases. To the extent that
exuberant interpretations of KSR in the lower courts produce
numerous summary judgment grants on obviousness, the Federal
Circuit should exercise a moderating influence, preserving the role
of the fact-finder.
Second, Judge Rader’s dissent appropriately invokes classic
themes of the dangers of hindsight bias and subjectivity in
obviousness analysis, dangers that are especially salient when the
subject matter at issue is regarded as “non-technical.” 61 The
majority had gone astray because it viewed the invention as
humble and concluded a priori that the invention should therefore
58

Id. at 1341 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id.
60
Id.
61
Media Techs., 596 F.3d at 1340 (Rader, J., dissenting).
59
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be deemed obvious. Judge Rader stated:
Lurking just beneath the surface of this court’s
blindness to the underlying facts supporting nonobviousness is a bias against non-technical arts. No
doubt, the invention of the transistor or of the polio
vaccine came from more scientific fields and
contributed more to the welfare of humanity. This
court, however, cannot overlook that many
individuals invest vast energies, efforts, and
earnings to advance these nontechnical fields of
human endeavor. Those investments deserve the
same protection as any other advances. The
incentives for improvement and the protection of
invention apply as well to the creator of a new hairextension design as to a researcher pursuing a cure
for cancer. In either case, the PTO and this court are
charged with assessing the invention disclosure to
determine its worthiness to receive a valuable, but
temporally limited, exclusive right. Because this
court dismisses this case so readily, I respectfully
dissent. 62
This is classic obviousness language, worthy of Judge Giles
Rich, whose opinions on obviousness—and not a few other
matters—surely set the gold standard.
The KSR opinion closes with an eloquent disquisition on the
connection between a robust obviousness standard and the ultimate
instrumental goals of the patent system. 63 So, too, Judge Rader’s
62

Id. at 1342 (Rader, J., dissenting). But cf. Rothman v. Target, 556 F.3d
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (upholding jury verdict of obviousness). In Rothman,
Judge Rader steered clear of relying on the simplicity of the technology, but he
did characterize the invention as one that “falls into a very predictable field,”
and observed that “[i]n the predictable arts, a trial record may more readily show
a motivation to combine known elements to yield a predictable result, thus
rendering a claimed invention obvious.” Id. at 1319 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. 398
(2007)).
63
As the Court put it:
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable
reality around us new works based on instinct, simple logic,
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Media Technologies dissent closes with a potent reminder that
there is a fine line between applying obviousness robustly and
transmuting it into a subjective judicial veto of patent rights. 64 The
two passages together neatly encapsulate the push and pull of over
a century and a half of obviousness jurisprudence. As that
jurisprudence moves beyond KSR, it will continue to fall chiefly to
Judge Rader and his colleagues to ensure that the obviousness
doctrine remains muscular without becoming tyrannical.

ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even
genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge,
define a new threshold from which innovation starts once
more. And as progress beginning from higher levels of
achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights
under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents might stifle,
rather than promote, the progress of useful arts. These
premises led to the bar on patents claiming obvious subject
matter established in [Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248
(1851)] and codified in § 103. Application of the bar must not
be confined within a test or formulation too constrained to
serve its purpose.
KSR, 550 U.S. at 427 (citation omitted).
64
This is so whether or not one agrees with Judge Rader’s views on the
disposition of the obviousness issue in the case.

